AFC Multi-Club Ownership Rule: Al Nassr Faces Exclusion Risk from AFC Champions League 2027-2028

I started following this story not from an official statement, but from a discrepancy in the registration records. When the AFC announced the list of teams participating in the 2026-2026 AFC Champions League, I noticed that three Saudi Arabian clubs — Al Nassr, Al Ittihad, and Al Ahli — all shared one common characteristic: the ownership stake of Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF) in each exceeded 75%. This figure was not coincidental. It was an anomaly that any investigative journalist would trace back through the money flow to uncover the underlying truth. The context of the issue began in July 2026, when the AFC officially adopted new regulations on Multi-Club Ownership (MCO). Under these rules, starting from the 2027-2028 season, any club sharing the same owner with another club participating in the same continental competition would be excluded from the AFC Champions League. This regulation was designed based on the principle of ensuring competitive fairness, similar to rules UEFA has applied to European competitions. However, the critical point lies in the ownership threshold: the AFC has not yet disclosed whether the 75% or 100% threshold will be applied, and this ambiguity has created a legal gray zone fraught with risk. Deeper analysis of the ownership structure reveals that PIF holds controlling stakes in the three largest clubs in Saudi Arabia. Al Nassr, Cristiano Ronaldo's club, is one of the teams that has benefited most from the sovereign wealth fund's massive capital injection. Since the 2026-2026 season, PIF has pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into the squad, bringing in stars like Sadio Mané, Marcelo Brozović, and Aymeric Laporte. Similarly, Al Ittihad boasts Karim Benzema and N'Golo Kanté, while Al Ahli has Riyad Mahrez and Franck Kessié. All three clubs are expected to compete for AFC Champions League spots in the coming seasons. The problem became more serious when I cross-referenced the AFC's new regulations with the ownership reality. If PIF does not restructure its portfolio before the 2027-2028 season, all three clubs will violate the MCO regulations. In that case, the AFC would have to choose one of two options: either exclude two of the three clubs, or force PIF to divest from at least one club. This is a governance dilemma, and it raises a critical question: is PIF willing to sacrifice one of its most important sporting assets to comply with the regulations? From a tactical and commercial analysis perspective, Al Nassr's exclusion from the AFC Champions League would directly impact Cristiano Ronaldo's late-career project. Since joining Al Nassr in January 2026, Ronaldo has built his image around conquering the continental stage. The AFC Champions League is the only platform that allows him to continue competing at an international level after leaving Europe. If excluded, Ronaldo would be left with only the Saudi Pro League and the AFC Cup 2 — Asia's second-tier competition — as his primary arenas. This would not only diminish the club's commercial value but also affect the sporting legacy of the Portuguese superstar. However, this story is not merely about Ronaldo. It reflects a deeper structural issue in modern football: the conflict between the multi-club ownership model and the principle of competitive fairness. PIF is not the only case. City Football Group (CFG) owns Manchester City, Girona, Melbourne City, and numerous other clubs worldwide. The Red Bull Group operates RB Leipzig, Red Bull Salzburg, and New York Red Bulls. Recently, John Textor's Eagle Football Holdings has also expanded its portfolio across multiple countries. Each of these ownership groups faces similar challenges as continental federations tighten regulations. The blind spot in my analysis lies in whether the AFC's regulations will extend to cross-confederation ownership. Newcastle United, which is 85% owned by PIF, competes in the English Premier League under UEFA's governance. If the AFC applies the MCO regulations broadly, including clubs owned by the same entity but in different confederations, then Newcastle United would also be affected. However, as of now, the AFC has not provided detailed guidance on this matter. This ambiguity creates a significant legal risk for all multi-club ownership groups. From an opportunity perspective, the AFC's new regulations could trigger a wave of restructuring in Saudi Arabian football. If PIF is forced to divest from one of the three clubs, that would create opportunities for other regional or international investors. Private investment funds from Gulf countries, Europe, and even Asia could seize this opportunity to acquire stakes in Al Ittihad or Al Ahli. This would not only diversify the ownership structure in Saudi Arabian football but could also create a healthier competitive ecosystem. Another important signal to monitor is whether the Saudi Pro League will see its AFC Champions League allocation increased from four to five clubs starting from the 2027-2028 season. If this happens, even if PIF must divest from one club, the remaining two could still qualify for Asia's most prestigious competition. However, this path depends on whether the AFC agrees to increase the allocation and whether Saudi clubs can meet the strict sporting and financial standards. From my personal experience, I have witnessed similar cases during my investigative career. In 2026, when I was still an intern, I saw a Vietnamese club excluded from a continental competition due to ownership regulation violations. At the time, I did not fully grasp the importance of the issue. But after six years in the industry, I have come to realize that ownership regulations are not merely administrative procedures — they are tools to protect the integrity of the sport. When one ownership group controls multiple clubs in the same competition, the risk of conflicts of interest is enormous, and that can undermine fan trust. Money in football never disappears; only people who lack patience fail to trace it. In this case, PIF's capital has created a football empire in Saudi Arabia, but the very scale of that empire has become a threat to its own existence. From the 2027-2028 season, the question is no longer whether Al Nassr can win the AFC Champions League, but whether they will be allowed to participate in it at all. This is a turning point that could reshape the entire landscape of Asian football in the coming decade. My mistake at the 2026 World Cup taught me that ignoring match context can lead to wrong conclusions. Similarly, in this case, if we only look at Al Nassr's sporting achievements while ignoring the ownership structure, we will miss the bigger picture. The AFC's MCO regulations are not a minor change — they are a structural shift with the potential to redefine the power map of Asian football. And the question is: will PIF be wise enough to adapt to this new reality, or will they let their empire collapse under its own weight?