Domestic FootballIndonesia's Two Sets of Files: Maarten Paes, Ole Romeny and the Real Cost of ASEAN's Naturalization Race
Domestic Football

Indonesia's Two Sets of Files: Maarten Paes, Ole Romeny and the Real Cost of ASEAN's Naturalization Race

**Core answer**: Indonesia naturalized Maarten Paes (goalkeeper, Dutch East Indies ancestry) and Ole Romeny (striker) by clearing two legal gates: Indonesian Citizenship Law No. 12/2006 (Article 20, House approval) and FIFA eligibility rules on grandparent birthplace. No transfer fee was paid; the real costs are administrative, political, and developmental. The strategy relies on a finite, non-renewable colonial-era diaspora pool. **Key facts**: - Maarten Paes, born 1998, former Netherlands U21 goalkeeper, received Indonesian citizenship in April 2024; FIFA approved his association switch in August 2024. - Ole Romeny took his Indonesian citizenship oath in February 2025, cleared FIFA on the grandparent-born-on-territory criterion. - Both cleared two independent gates: Indonesian citizenship law and FIFA's substantial-connection rule. Neither gate requires indigenous blood. - The grandparent-birthplace criterion is a designed FIFA rule, not a legal loophole; calling it a loophole misstates the law. - Indonesia's diaspora pool (Dutch East Indies descendants) is finite and non-renewable, making the model a time window, not a permanent strategy. **Source attribution**: Kompas (Indonesian mainstream outlet, 2024-2025); FIFA change-of-association notices (August 2024); Indonesian Citizenship Law No. 12/2006; FIFA Regulations Governing the Application of the FIFA Statutes (article/year to be verified) | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A**: - Q: Did Paes and Romeny qualify legally for Indonesia? A: Yes — both cleared Indonesian citizenship law and FIFA eligibility, verified via DPR approval and FIFA association records. - Q: Can Vietnam replicate Indonesia's model? A: Not easily — Vietnam lacks a comparable colonial-era diaspora with a birthplace inside its current borders, per the VangBong.vn Player Depth Index. - Q: What is the biggest long-term risk? A: Supply exhaustion of Dutch East Indies descendants, which caps the model's lifespan, tracked via VangBong.vn Diaspora Eligibility Tracker.

August 2026. I was sitting in a cafe in Beijing's Chaoyang district, reopening a FIFA notice that few people read to the end. On the seventh line of the change-of-association document, a name appeared: Maarten Paes. A goalkeeper born in 2026, formerly of the Netherlands U21 side, now on the books of the Indonesia national team. There was no signing ceremony. There was no transfer fee. There was only an administrative signature and a file submitted on time. Six months later, in February 2026, in Jakarta, another player named Ole Romeny took an oath before Indonesia's House of Representatives. Again no transfer fee. Again no leaked contract. The combined market value of these two players, by public data estimates, falls somewhere between 7 and 8 million euros under conventional buying logic. Indonesia paid with something else: time, paperwork, and a name on a birth certificate of a grandparent born in the Dutch East Indies more than eighty years ago. This is a deal the transfer board never records.

I begin with a number and end with a name. The number here is 2026 — the year sovereignty passed from the Netherlands to Indonesia. The name here is Paes, is Romeny, are the Indies surnames still sitting in the civil registries of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Between that number and that name lies a legal corridor that most Southeast Asian fans have not read closely, even as it quietly reshapes the regional pecking order.

This article is not a transfer news item. Nor is it praise or criticism for the Indonesian football federation. It is a file comparison: two sets of documents for the same national team, one for the press and one sitting in a disciplinary committee's drawer, plus a third that nobody dares name — the bloodline file.

Context: When Southeast Asia Becomes a Battleground of Paperwork

Southeast Asia has never been a region of football powers. We have Thailand with a stable academy base, Vietnam with the 2026 golden generation and a youth development system invested in afterward, and Malaysia and Philippines with scattered naturalization experiments that never became systematic. Indonesia, through the first two decades of this century, was a team of short bursts followed by sinking. But from 2026 onward, something changed in how they recruit.

Indonesia's Two Sets of Files: Maarten Paes, Ole Romeny and the Real Cost of ASEAN's Naturalization Race

That change did not come from the pitch. It came from the boardroom. The Indonesian football federation (PSSI) began operating like the recruiting arm of a multinational corporation: identify the missing position, build a shortlist of candidates abroad, check lineage records, then carry out the legal procedure. The 2026-2026 period saw a wave of naturalizations denser than anything in Southeast Asian football history. Not one or two names. A full squad.

I have tracked World Cup qualifiers in Asia for years, and what I see is this: Southeast Asia is running two parallel models, opposite in philosophy but aimed at one goal. Vietnam chooses the sowing path — academy investment, keeping players domestic, building a collective style with identity. Indonesia chooses the harvest path — finding people already trained in Europe, bringing them home by law. Both paths are legal. But they generate entirely different kinds of risk, and most fans see only the final scoreline.

The 2026 World Cup data taught me: every team has two sets of files. One for display, one for operation. For Indonesia today, the display file sits in the press with simple words — the team got stronger. The operation file sits in parliamentary decrees, FIFA circulars, and the small print of citizenship law. I will go into the second file, because that is where the truth resides.

The Core: Two Legal Gates and a Bloodline Corridor

The first gate — Indonesian citizenship law

For a foreign player to wear the Indonesia shirt, he must be an Indonesian citizen. This sounds obvious, but it is the first gate and the one most media platforms skip. Indonesia's Citizenship Law No. 12 of 2026 sets out the routes to citizenship, including a special provision — often described as naturalization in the national interest — allowing the House of Representatives to approve citizenship for individuals deemed to make a special contribution to the country. Article 20 of that law is the key.

Remarkably, this gate is political rather than administrative. It does not require indigenous bloodline. It does not require the applicant to be born in Indonesia. It requires Indonesia's House of Representatives — the legislature — to agree by a separate decision for each case. This means every naturalization of a footballer passes through a process many countries reserve for diplomats or strategic investors. A goalkeeper and an infrastructure investor walk through the same door.

For Maarten Paes, the process completed in April 2026. For Ole Romeny, the same process completed in February 2026 with an oath ceremony. Both received Indonesian citizenship. Both renounced their original citizenship — a point worth noting given Indonesia's strict single-nationality principle.

The second gate — FIFA regulations

Citizenship is not enough. FIFA has its own regulatory system to determine who may represent a member association. That system sits in the regulations governing the application of the FIFA Statutes, commonly abbreviated RGAS. Its core is the concept the sports-law world calls a substantial connection to the association.

Put simply: FIFA requires a player who wants to switch associations to have one of several specific connections. It may be place of birth, current nationality, place of birth of the biological father or mother, or place of birth of a grandparent. For Paes and Romeny, the connection used was a grandparent born on the territory of the association — that is, on the territory of the former Dutch East Indies, today's Indonesia.

What Indonesian media calls a legal loophole is in fact a criterion FIFA designed. The grandparent-born-on-territory criterion is not a technical bug. It is a deliberate rule built to reflect the historical reality of countries with large diaspora communities and borders that have changed over time. This is the point I will return to in the contrarian section.

Neither gate requires a player to have indigenous blood. Neither gate requires Austronesian, Malay, or any other ethnographic structure. Put dryly: eligibility is not indigeneity. This is the dispositive legal point of the whole story, and also the point most social media posts skip.

Case one — Maarten Paes and the edge of the change-of-association rule

Paes is the more legally delicate case. Unlike Romeny, Paes had represented a Dutch youth national team, specifically the Netherlands U21. This puts him within reach of the change-of-association rule, which has stricter conditions than for a player who has never represented any federation's national team.

Under FIFA's rules on a one-time association switch, a player who has played for one federation is not permanently locked out. But he must meet specific conditions regarding number of appearances, age at the time of playing, and criteria relating to the connection to the new federation. Paes was born in 2026, and his U21 Netherlands appearances are a detail sitting at the edge of the rule, not the center. This is the kind of detail sports lawyers must check twice before filing.

According to Indonesian sources, Paes's file was pursued persistently by PSSI over an extended period, with non-trivial legal and human resource costs. FIFA approved the association switch for Paes in August 2026. After citizenship in April and FIFA confirmation in August, Paes became fully eligible to wear the Indonesia shirt.

Here is the detail I want readers to remember, because it breaks a common stereotype. Many people think naturalizing a player is a simple administrative step: sign papers, take an oath, done. The reality is far more complex. For a player who has represented a European federation's youth team, the process has two independent layers: the citizenship layer of the receiving country, and the FIFA association layer. Both can refuse. And once refused at the FIFA layer, that player can never wear the new federation's shirt.

PSSI cleared both layers for Paes. That is a notable operational achievement, regardless of whether we agree with a mass naturalization policy.

Case two — Ole Romeny and the necessary simplification

Romeny was simpler on the FIFA side. He had never represented any Dutch youth national team, or if he had, not at a level that brought him into the strict change-of-association rule. This means his file did not need the one-time switch mechanism, only the ordinary substantial-connection criterion — in which a grandparent born on the association's territory is the qualifying condition.

In February 2026, Romeny took the oath, formally becoming an Indonesian citizen, completing the citizenship gate. The FIFA gate was quickly cleared as well because he had never been bound to another federation.

Romeny's position is a center-forward — one of the two highest-leverage positions on a team, along with goalkeeper. This is not a random detail. A national team can play without a winger and suffer little structural damage. But lacking a goalkeeper or a center-forward at international level is often the end of a World Cup qualifying chance. Indonesia filled exactly those two positions first. It was a calculated choice, not random harvesting.

The bloodline corridor — the Dutch East Indies and those who stayed

Behind the two legal gates lies a longer story reaching back to the nineteenth century. The Dutch East Indies was a colony of the Dutch empire for over three hundred years. During that time, a community of European descent — mainly Dutch, but also German, Belgian, French lineages — settled here long term. They were not temporary garrison troops. They were stayers, having children and building lives. In Dutch, they were given a specific word to distinguish them from those who merely came and went.

After Indonesia won independence in 2026, most of this community evacuated to the Netherlands. But their traces remain in the civil registries. On the birth certificate of a Dutch person born in 2026 in Rotterdam or The Hague, the birthplace of parents and grandparents may still list a city in Java or Sumatra. Nearly a century later, the descendants of those people can become recruiting targets for a football federation.

This is the crux I want to stress: the talent supply for Indonesia's naturalization model is a closed historical population that cannot be renewed. The number of people of Dutch East Indies descent, or with ancestors born in the Dutch East Indies, is finite, growing only by natural birth rate without new additions. The day that community is fully tapped, this bloodline corridor closes. Indonesia cannot treat this as a permanent strategy. It can only treat it as a window.

Vietnam has no comparable door. Vietnam's colonial history differs, and the community of French or French-descended long-term settlers in Vietnam was far smaller, and mostly departed during 2026-2026. The Vietnamese diaspora in France, the US, Australia, Canada is a different kind of resource — they carry Vietnamese blood, which is actually easier on identity grounds, but harder on professional football training. In other words, Indonesia has a door Vietnam lacks, but that door is slowly closing.

The economics of a naturalization — no transfer fee, but a hidden bill

This is the section I care about most as a data person. In football, everything has a price. A good player has a price. A good coach has a price. A World Cup slot has a price. So what is the price of a naturalization?

By the transfer board, the number is zero. No fee is paid to the owning club, since the naturalized player remains on the books of his old club in the Netherlands or elsewhere. No release clause. No agent commission in the transfer sense. On paper, this is a free deal.

But anyone who has worked with administrative files knows: free on paper does not mean free in reality. The real price of a naturalization sits in three line items.

The first is legal and administrative cost. Getting a file through both Indonesian citizenship law and FIFA regulations requires international lawyers, civil registry evidence, certified translations, cross-border travel, and working time with state agencies. For Paes, having to handle the additional association-switch layer made the cost significantly higher. From what I know of sports naturalizations in Asia, legal costs for a complex file can reach hundreds of thousands of US dollars.

The second is political cost. Every naturalization approved by the House is one more time the football federation spends political credibility with the parties. This cost never appears on a financial statement, but it exists, and it limits how many naturalizations can be done in one political term.

The third, and the one I want to give the most words to, is the opportunity cost to the domestic youth development system. When a federation chooses naturalization as the main path to raise national team quality, it is indirectly telling domestic academies: we have a faster way. This is the substitution effect no financial report records, but it will surface in ten years as a generation of domestic players with weakened motivation to reach the top, because the top has been occupied by people from elsewhere.

When the pitch closes, the money flow must declare its identity. Here, when the boardroom opens, the file must declare its nature. The nature of a naturalization is not a market transaction. It is a policy decision disguised as a sporting move. And every policy decision has winners and losers.

The regional wave and the risk of an arms race

Indonesia is not the only Southeast Asian country on this path. The Philippines experimented long ago with a diaspora community in the US. Malaysia has a community of ethnic Malays abroad. Thailand has a few cases. But no country has organized it into a systematic campaign at Indonesia's scale in 2026-2026.

Indonesia's Two Sets of Files: Maarten Paes, Ole Romeny and the Real Cost of ASEAN's Naturalization Race

When one country in a region succeeds with a model, others copy it. This is basic competitive logic. Within one to three years, I predict at least two other Southeast Asian federations will try to replicate Indonesia's model. But they will hit a barrier Indonesia did not: supply. Not every country has a large historical diaspora community with a birthplace inside its current borders. Indonesia was fortunate on this front. So was the Netherlands, from the reverse angle.

The bigger risk is that a race erodes the value of the advantage. When everyone naturalizes, the benefit of naturalizing disappears. This is a classic paradox. Indonesia is faster than the rest in a race it started, but if that race spreads, the gap will narrow. And what remains will be a region where domestic football is pushed to secondary status — something both Vietnamese and Thai fans have reason not to want.

The third file — the national team and unmeasured sporting consequences

I have gone through the two legal file sets, and here I must say something uncomfortable for those seeking evidence for the claim that Indonesia got stronger.

As of now, no measurable data on the Indonesia national team's improvement has been published in a verifiable way. No expected-goals comparison before and after Paes and Romeny. No qualifier point comparison against a control sample. The claim that naturalization strengthens the team is a narrative claim, not a data claim.

That does not mean the claim is false. It only means we have no measured evidence. In theory, adding a goalkeeper trained in the Dutch system and a center-forward operating in Europe to a Southeast Asian national team almost certainly raises the quality floor. But floor and ceiling are two different things. A team can raise its floor while its ceiling stays put, if the tactical system and cohesion do not keep pace.

This is the point I stress as a methodological warning: do not let paperwork numbers substitute for match numbers. A perfect naturalization file does not guarantee a win. It only guarantees the right to play. From the right to play to a result is a gap many national teams have failed to cross.

The Contrarian Section: The Curse of the So-Called Loophole

Now I come to the part I consider most important in this article, and also the part most editorials on naturalization skip.

Indonesian media, in some articles, used the phrase legal loophole to describe how Paes and Romeny gained the right to wear the national shirt. The phrase sounds catchy, evocative, and easy to turn into a headline. But it is not accurate in legal terms, and that inaccuracy has consequences.

The criterion allowing a player to represent a federation if his grandparent was born on that federation's territory is a designed part of FIFA's regulatory system, not a hole. It exists for a clear historical reason: many countries have borders that have changed multiple times, and have communities living where today is a different country than when their grandparents were born. FIFA cannot build a system based solely on current birthplace, because doing so would strip representation rights from a large number of players. The grandparent criterion is a balancing solution.

Calling it a loophole implies that those using it are doing something wrong or gaming the rules. But Paes and Romeny are not gaming the rules. They are using a path that the law, both in Indonesia and at FIFA, deliberately opened. A player with a grandparent born in the Dutch East Indies who qualifies for Indonesian naturalization under citizenship law is a fully eligible player.

What is interesting is how this media framing can come from reputable newspapers. Not because they do not understand the law, but because the loophole frame produces a more compelling story. A story of players who are legal under the rules has no climax. A story of players without indigenous blood wearing the national shirt has a climax. This is how media operates, and it is not new.

But if we strip away the media frame and look at legal fact, we see a different picture. The real problem of Indonesia's naturalization model is not validity. It sits in three other points, and those are the ones I argue deserve discussion.

Point one is collective identity in the dressing room. A national team is not a collection of individuals with valid legal status. It is a temporary community organized around a short-term goal. When half the squad comes from an entirely different football culture, from European academies, speaking Dutch or English better than Indonesian, the question is no longer whether they are eligible. The question is whether they can integrate with domestic players who grew up in the Indonesian football system. This is a problem naturalization models in many countries have faced, from Japan to Qatar.

Point two is the time needed for integration. Football does not grant time. World Cup qualifiers run on a fixed calendar. A naturalized player may need a year to get used to new teammates, a new tactical system, the way Asian opponents play. During that year, the national team must still compete. If results are poor during the integration phase, pressure will fall on the naturalization policy itself, and the political cycle may reverse before the strategy matures.

Point three, and the one I consider most serious, is the development incentive for domestic players. I am not talking about an abstract sense of unfairness. I am talking about concrete economic decisions. A seventeen-year-old Indonesian player, facing a choice between staying to develop in the domestic system and shifting to another industry, will look up at the national team and see a forward line full of people from the Netherlands. He will ask himself: where is my chance. Not everyone can answer that by trying twice as hard. Most will choose another path.

This is the hidden cost of the naturalization model, and it will not appear in any data table for a few years. It will appear after around a decade, as a thinned-out generation of domestic players. For Indonesia, a country of two hundred seventy million, that thinned generation will still be enough to produce quality players. But for smaller countries in the region, the consequences will be heavier.

Risk File and Signals to Track

Not all risks carry equal weight. In analyzing Indonesia's naturalization file, I rank risk in three tiers.

Tier one — legal risk — is low for the two completed cases. Paes and Romeny passed two gates with no sign of a challenged file. The only remaining risk at this tier is if another naturalization case in the future runs into a paperwork dispute and raises doubt about the validity of a whole prior batch. This is a chain risk, low probability but high impact.

Tier two — reputational risk — is medium. The loophole and no-indigenous-blood media frames are generating psychological pressure on the naturalization policy. If Indonesia loses an important qualifier, the criticism wave will likely target this policy rather than specific tactical factors. This is an asymmetric risk: success is credited to the whole team, but failure is charged to the naturalized players.

Tier three — long-term structural risk — is medium to high. This is supply exhaustion. The supply of players with Dutch East Indies ancestry is finite. Within five to ten years, the easiest cases — those with clear lineage records and sufficiently high football level — will be tapped out. After that, the cost of finding and processing files rises while the quality of players obtained falls. This is a basic economic law of any finite resource.

On signals to track over the next 12 to 24 months, I list four.

First, any new naturalization announced by PSSI. Each new case is a data point on the pace of supply extraction. If the pace accelerates, that is a sign of a race. If it slows, that may signal exhaustion or a strategic adjustment.

Second, any FIFA move to adjust the substantial-connection criterion. So far there is no signal. But if global naturalization cases rise, pressure from affected federations could lead to a regulatory review. This is an event that could change the whole landscape within months.

Third, the response of other federations in the region, especially Vietnam and Thailand. If either begins calling up foreign players with domestic ancestry, that signals the race has spread.

Fourth, the Indonesia national team's actual performance in upcoming qualifiers, especially indicators of attacking and defensive coordination. If these indicators show clear improvement over the period before Paes and Romeny, that is the first verifiable data for the stronger-team claim. If the indicators are flat, that signals the personnel upgrade has not yet converted into a system upgrade.

Progressive Conclusion

Southeast Asia's naturalization race is not a story about morality. It is a story about development choices in a region where football has never had the resources to compete at the world's highest tier. Indonesia chose the fast path. Vietnam chose the deep path. Both have their reasons, and both have their price.

What I take from this file is not a verdict. It is a reminder about method. When a federation announces an achievement, we should find out what unit that achievement is measured in. When a newspaper calls something a loophole, we should re-read the original text to see whether it is truly a hole or a designed rule. When a country changes how it builds a national team, we should ask where the resources for that change come from, and when they will run out.

Southeast Asian football is entering a phase where decisions made in the boardroom can matter more than decisions on the training pitch. Those who understand the systems of paperwork, the systems of rules, and the systems of bloodlines will be the first to see the region's direction over the next decade. The rest will only see scorelines, and will wonder why everything changed so fast with no one explaining it to them.

Indonesia's Two Sets of Files: Maarten Paes, Ole Romeny and the Real Cost of ASEAN's Naturalization Race

A sponsorship contract never dies; it only waits for someone who knows how to dig it up. A civil registry file is the same. It lies still in a Rotterdam drawer for seventy years, waiting for someone who knows how to read the name of a city on a birth certificate.

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